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Occupational Safety in China’s Coal Mining Industry:  
The role of regulations, human resources and labor relations 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a theoretical framework of the industrial relations system in China’s coal 
mining industry, combining the roles of management organizations, workers and trade unions, 
as well as government agencies. It is one of the first empirical attempts to investigate the 
relationship between human resource practices, labor relations and occupational safety in 
China’s coal mining industry over the past 60 years, based on secondary data on coal mining 
accidents and case studies of two state-owned coal mines in the City of Huaibei in Anhui 
Province, China. The fluctuating occupational safety has been affected by government 
regulations over different time spans, marked by key political agendas, and by coal mining 
firms taking concrete measures to respond to these regulations, while exhibiting differing 
safety performance in state-owned versus township-and-village-owned mines. The field 
studies compared a safety-oriented to a cost-control-oriented human resource and labor 
relations system, and their influences on safety performance. Coal mining firms and 
practitioners are advised to shift the traditional personnel management paradigm to a modern 
human resource management system. In addition, although workers are often blamed directly 
for accidents, it is suggested that workers’ participation and voice in various processes of 
decision-making and policy implementation, and trade unions’ active involvement in 
protecting workers from occupational hazards, be encouraged.  
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The occupational safety situation in China’s coal mining industry is notorious for having the 
largest number of accidents and casualties among workers reported worldwide. Since 2006, 
under crackdowns by the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) and the State 
Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMS), two central government administrations 
dealing with occupational safety and health (OSH), significant progress has been made (Kong, 
Cai, & Guo, 2010; Kong, Cai, & Zhang, 2011; Xinhua Net, 2015). However, safety records 
are still strikingly poor compared with those in developed, as well as some developing, 
countries.  
   During the rapid economic globalization that has taken place since the 1980s, the safety of 
the production environment around the world has deteriorated steadily (Mogensen, 2006). In 
particular, Chinese workers and their managers seem to be much more vulnerable and more 
prone to engage in unsafe behaviors in the workplace, for a complex set of reasons, some of 
which are organizational and managerial problems in general, others specific to China itself, 
and embedded deeply in the Chinese social, cultural, legal, and political systems. As a result, 
the official white paper Notice on Improving Firm Safety Production Work called upon all 
coal mining firms to ‘strengthen firm safety management’ and make it the top priority 
(China’s State Council, 2010). The thirteenth Five-Year plan for coal mine safety production 
issued by SAWS and SACMS in June 2017 set up targets such that, by 2020, the number of 
coal mining casualties should have steadily decreased, with serious accidents in particular 
effectively contained, and progress should have been made in occupational hazard prevention 
and control to at least the level of medium-developed countries, providing a fundamentally 
better coal mine safety production situation (China’s State Council, 2017). 
   What are the determinants of the enormously high rate of fatal accidents in Chinese coal 
mining firms? What are the organizational and managerial factors that contribute to the huge 
number of casualties in coal mining workplaces? Furthermore, what are the institutional 
mechanisms within which Chinese coal mining firms combat these hazardous accidents? 
What are the human resource and employment relationship implications for coal mining firms 
regarding their effective safeguarding of the well-being and lives of their workers? These 
critical questions have yet to be addressed at either the practical or the theoretical level. As 
such, this study aims to find an effective way for both policy makers and practitioners in the 
coal mining industry to save more lives in this hazardous working environment and put a stop 
to the seemingly endless rash of fatal accidents. 
   Prior literature indicates that human resource management and employment relations are 
related to occupational safety (e.g., Brenner et al., 2004; Butler & Park, 2005; Kochan, Smith, 
Wells, & Rebitzer, 1994; Lauver, 2004, 2007). However, there is some controversy regarding 
the contents of these practices and the direction of the relationship. Yet, relatively few studies 
(exceptions include Zacharatos, 2001; Zacharatos, Barling & Iverson, 2005) have explored 
the mechanism by which organizational management practices affect safety. On the other 
hand, an increasing number of research works have discussed coal mining safety issues in 
China in recent years, but most have been qualitative in nature (Chen, 2006; Guo, 2008), and 
few of them have tackled the sophisticated employment relationship in the context of Chinese 
political economy, combined both macro and micro factors, or tested them empirically. This 
paper addresses a wide range of issues, from institutional changes over different time periods 
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in the coal industry, to how these institutions are manifested in government regulations and 
then transferred into stakes and foci for management and workers. In particular, since 2005, 
China’s State Council has made earnest endeavors to control the number of hazardous 
occupational incidents by issuing policies, and since 2008 there has been a new round of 
restructuring and reorganizing of state-owned coal mines. Thus, we ask: Are these regulations 
really useful in controlling accidents? Do state-owned coal mines perform better than other 
ownership types? How do coal mines respond to government regulations in terms of 
management and inspections? Are there any obstacles in implementing the regulations? 
These are questions yet to be answered empirically, and we seek to explore them in this 
article.  
   Based on a systematic literature review of human variables that affect occupational safety at 
the individual, organizational and national levels, and a historical descriptive analysis of the 
evolution of safety in China’s coal mining industry, we propose a theoretical framework of 
the industrial relations system constituted by management organizations, workers and trade 
unions, and government agencies (Dunlop, 1993), which predicts occupational safety. In 
particular, we investigated the roles of different players to reveal the complex picture in this 
hazardous industry. Through case studies of two state-owned coal mines in Huaibei City of 
Anhui Province, we examined major human as well as institutional factors that had directly 
or indirectly caused fatal accidents in coal mining workplaces. We found that the cost-
control-oriented human resource and labor relations system was more likely to cause the 
necessary attention to be deviated away from safety issues, and to instigate dangerous 
behaviors, producing a higher likelihood of fatal accidents in the workplace. In contrast, the 
safety-oriented human resource and labor relations system was found to be positively related 
to occupational safety performance, and the practices of this system are inter-related in such a 
way that failure to carry out certain practices will affect the fulfillment of other practices. 
Compared with other industries, the working conditions and environment in coal mining are 
much more hazardous, which not only makes fatal accidents a greater possibility, but also 
necessitates tough and rigorous measures in managerial as well as technical practices in order 
to ensure safe behaviors are followed by the workers. The role of workers and workers’ 
collective groups (trade unions) was examined, which led to the pertinent suggestion that 
workers’ participation and involvement in various processes of decision-making and policy 
implementation should be encouraged.  
   In the following sections, we will first briefly review the literature, introduce the historical 
development in China’s coal mining sector and build our theoretical framework, then 
examine and analyze the empirical materials from the field studies, and finally discuss and 
draw conclusions about our findings.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Occupational safety refers to the process by which a firm eliminates potential conditions that 
may cause casualties, occupational hazards and diseases, or equipment and property loss, or 
that could jeopardize the environment (Shi, 2009). Numerous studies have investigated the 
human factors that impact occupational safety performance from multiple levels. 
   At the individual level, employees’ personal characteristics, e.g., personality, values and 
past experience, have been proven to link to occupational safety. It has been argued that some 
employees are more inclined to be involved in accidents, and this minority group of workers 
has been the focus of organizations seeking to attribute the causes of accidents to them (Kay, 
1971), despite the lack of empirical data supporting the accident inclination theory (Dwyer, 
1991). Some personal traits of employees have been linked to the occurrence of accidents 
both directly and indirectly. There traits include aggressiveness, neuroticism, levels of IQ, 
introversion/extroversion etc. (e.g., Sutherland & Cooper, 1991), although the causal 
relationship for the direct effect seems to have been problematic having been based mostly on 
retrospective data. It has usually been concluded that workers’ personalities may indirectly 
influence safety through a series of environmental factors, such as the organizational 
environment (Frone, 1998), time pressure, managers’ commitment to safety, and their 
capacity to control risks (Weyman, Clarke & Cox, 2003).  
   Chinese data have revealed that workers’ personality dimensions of anxiety and risk-taking 
are positively related to their tendency to break regulations at work (Chen, 2006). However, it 
is noteworthy that the use of accident inclination and personality to study the relationship 
between employees’ personal characteristics and safety has been challenged from legal and 
ethical aspects (Zacharatos, 2001), as it would be inappropriate for an organization to choose 
not to employ someone just because s/he was regarded as more inclined to experience more 
occupational hazards. Also, employees’ experience of stressful incidents in the past 
(combined with extreme tiredness) has been proven to cause hazards, with empirical support 
found (Shain, 1982; Holcom, Lehman & Simpson, 1993).   
   Another stream of safety research at the individual level lies in employees’ values, safety 
motivation, and perceptions of the safety climate and culture as seen by workers and 
managers. Ford and Tetrick (2008) put forward a model examining the direct impact of 
employee safety motivation on safety performance, and found employees’ personal values in 
terms of four factors, namely safety, health, stability and collective identity, to be connected 
with safety motivation. When these personal perceptions were aggregated together, in another 
piece of research, they formed two factors, safety climate and culture, both of which were 
related to safety performance (Zacharatos et al., 2005). Actually, mining workers’ 
participation was shown to be an important element of sustaining a corporate culture of safe 
production (Ariss, 2003). Besides workers’, managers’ perceptions of safety culture have also 
been found to impact organizational safety performance, e.g., via managers’ abilities 
(Kettunen, Reiman & Wahlström, 2007).  
   Individual-level HRM safety research has mainly investigated employees’ perceptions of 
HR practices and how they are related to safety outcomes. It has been found that employees’ 
perceptions of a high-performance work system were related to their personal safety 
orientation and safety incidents (Zacharatos et al., 2005). In an investigation of managers 
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working in the European nuclear industry, HRM was attributed most frequently as the most 
important determinant of occupational safety, with subfactors including workers’ age 
distribution, early retirement, new employee recruitment, and employees’ capacity 
sustainment, among others (Kettunen et al., 2007). Job characteristics, such as working hours, 
intensity, and homogeneity of job design, have also been found to potentially impact workers’ 
tendency to engage in regulation-breaking behaviors, supported by a Chinese sample (Chen, 
2006). 
   Having said this, most HRM and employment relationship studies in safety research have 
been conducted at the organizational level. Bowen and Ostroff (2004) stated that HR 
practices should largely be driven by the strategic goals and values of the organization. The 
foci of the HR practices must be designed around a particular strategic focus, such as safety, 
control or commitment, to name just a few. Lauver (2004, 2007) found that safety-oriented 
HR practices, e.g., individual compensation, group compensation, previous work experience, 
and drug testing, had a positive association with reduced organizational-level injuries. In a 
similar vein, Glendinning (2001) indicated that safety incentives were positively related to 
safety performance, and should be part of an overall safety strategy encompassing 
communication, education, training, monitoring, active participation and accountability. 
Zacharatos (2001) concluded that there are two sets of HR practices that foster occupational 
safety: control-oriented and commitment-oriented. According to control orientation, it is the 
responsibility of the employer to use their authority to control the employees’ behavior and 
coerce efficient performance from them (Barling & Hutchinson, 2000; Walton, 1985). 
Control-based HRM strategies have been said to rely on power-coercive techniques, and to 
typically be implemented in a relatively short time frame, but to be associated with high 
levels of conflict, resulting in increases in turnover and absenteeism (Butler & Teagarden, 
1993).  
   Commitment-based HRM operates under the assumption that employees will sustainably 
improve their work if encouraged to do so to achieve better work performance. When 
employees are respected, and regarded as capable, intelligent individuals, they will be more 
loyal to the organization and more trustful of the management, and in this way, organizational 
performance will be enhanced by the employees reciprocally (Walton, 1985). The set of 
commitment-oriented HR practices includes employment security, selective hiring, training, 
teams and decentralized decision-making, reduced status distinctions, information sharing, 
contingent compensation, transformational leadership, job quality, and measurement of 
variables critical to organizational success, which should be considered by firms wishing to 
enhance occupational safety (Pfeffer, 1998; Zacharatos, 2001).  
   Similarly, Bulter and Teagarden (1993) proposed three HR systems to respond to the issue 
of worker safety, health, and environmental problems, with control orientation as the first 
approach. The second HR system was based on human relations, with long-term strategic 
objectives of enhancing workers’ productivity and satisfaction, and which would take more 
time to implement than the control-oriented approach. This system could saliently decrease 
conflict, e.g., absenteeism and turnover. Employee training on task- and quality-related 
activities would usually feature highly in the system. The third system was the long-term 
HRM system, with an additional strategic objective of worker development compared with 
the second approach. It was said to be benefit maximizing, but would also bear the highest 
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training and recruitment costs in the short run.  
   Besides the abovementioned high-performance work system, general HR practices, both 
single and multiple, e.g., how employees are selected, developed, compensated and managed, 
have also been found to be correlated with safety outcomes. However, consistent conclusions 
have not been obtained regarding the direction and nature of those relationships. Butler and 
Park (2005) found that HR practices, such as employee participation in decision-making, 
could enhance employees’ safety motivation and thereby reduce accidents. Based on a sample 
of contractors in the United States and Singapore, Lai, Liu and Ling (2011) found that safety 
outcomes were positively related to HR practices, including taking age into consideration 
during the selection process, and giving feedback to workers about their unsafe behaviors.  
   Nevertheless, the relationship between HR practices and occupational safety performance 
has not always been found to be positive, and can be moderated by labor relations. Brenner et 
al. (2004), for instance, showed that ‘flexible’ work practices, such as the use of quality 
circles and just-in-time production, were positively related to cumulative trauma disorders, 
which can be attributed to reduced cycle times, speedups, ill-fitting parts, increased worker 
responsibility, and reduced worker empowerment. The employment relationship has a role in 
predicting occupational safety as well. Kochan et al. (1994) found that, although the contract 
form of employment relationship offered an important degree of flexibility, it could also 
create stress, with potentially severe adverse effects on workplace safety. To explain, it was 
indicated that a high level of coordination was required among HR professionals, line 
managers, corporate executives, unions, and government agencies in order to overcome the 
threat to safety while maintaining flexibility in the employment relationship. Additionally, 
workers’ type, e.g., temporary, contract or fixed, showed some correlation with the adoption 
of HR practices and workplace safety. For example, the safety training and supervision 
received by contract workers were not as effective as that received by fixed workers, which 
had some effect on accident rates (Rebitzer, 1995). This also reflects that labor relations 
(workers’ contracts in this case), together with the adoption of HR practices, could impact 
occupational safety.  
   Thus the way HR practices and employee relations operate in contributing to organizational 
performance remains a black box to a large extent (Kaufman & Miller, 2011; Lepak, Liao, 
Chung & Harden, 2006). To name a few intervening factors, the mechanisms by which HRM 
practices might improve occupational safety include employees’ safety motivation (Ford & 
Tetrick, 2008), their commitment (Iles, Mabey, & Robertson, 1990), as well as their attitudes, 
beliefs, and opinions on safety (Robertson, 1983), thus increasing their safety knowledge, 
skills, and ability to follow safety procedures. Employee-manager relations have been found 
to explain the HR-safety link to some extent, as research has shown that employees’ trust in 
the management affects safety performance directly, and mediates the relationship between 
HR practices and safety (Zacharatos et al., 2005). In another work, employees’ perceived 
safety was positively related to management’s care for employees and safety orientation, 
while, on the contrary, employees’ perceived safety was negatively related to management’s 
orientation towards productivity (Janssens, Brett & Frank, 1995). Chinese studies have 
indicated that the worker-management relationship is negatively related to the workers’ 
tendency to break regulations at work (Chen, 2006). Another mediator in the HR-safety link 
is a favorable safety climate and culture (Ariss, 2003; Kettunen et al., 2007; Neal & Griffin, 
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2004; Zacharatos et al., 2005). 
   Chinese domestic studies have noted that the HR practices in China’s coal mining industry 
are far from scientific and systematic. For example, they are old-fashioned in terms of routine 
personnel management, rigid in their staffing, lag behind in terms of long-term incentives, 
and are inefficient at performance appraisal, thus failing to either motivate employees or 
prevent accidents. There is a shortage of investment in employee training; almost all coal 
mining firms have been found to lack OSH training in particular (Li, 2006; Shen & Song, 
2007). Firm management practices have been studied as reasons for coal mining accidents 
and hazards. Management error, incorrect decisions and institutional factors have led workers 
to engage in unsafe behaviors, which have directly caused fatal accidents (e.g., Han & Yu, 
2006; Xiao, 2007). HR and labor relations, such as the motivation mechanism, compensation 
and punishment, safety training and education, and performance feedback, have all been 
argued to influence coal mining workers’ perceptions on safety and thus impact their choice 
of unsafe behaviors (Chen, 2006). Empirical data support Cao (2007)’s argument of a 
relationship between safety outcomes and safety training, communication and labor relations 
(Fan, Xie, Huang & Li, 2004). Similarly, communication, monitoring, motivation and a 
corporate culture of safe production have been studied (Peng & Huang, 2001). Fu and Nie 
(2006)’s opinions provide a relatively accurate picture that most coal mining workers’ 
knowledge, skills and mindset fail to meet the safety needs at the organizational level. Coal 
mining firms should adopt a new paradigm of modern HRM and an employment relations 
system to help them recruit and develop qualified labor, who fit in with the organizational 
goals of safe production.  
   From a more macro perspective, e.g., at the national level, Poole (1986) summarized the 
external institutional factors that could impact organizational management practices, and then 
affect outcomes (i.e., occupational safety). These institutions include social and cultural 
values, political ideologies, economic conditions, and public and legislative policies. Janssens 
et al. (1995) provided empirical support on the national differences in the predicting role of 
institutions, based on their international sample of French, American and Argentinean 
employees. Homer (2009) made a comparison of the safety records and influencing factors in 
the Chinese and American coal mining industries. Both countries had a unique legislation 
system in the coal mining sector, but the problem in China was that effective implementation 
of these safety laws and legislation could not be safeguarded, given the lack of supervision, 
lack of effective trade unions, corruption, and difficulties central government faced in 
managing township-and-village coal mines. In relation to this, a focus on township-and-
village coal mines has been called for, given the fact that most of the workers in these coal 
mines are untrained labor that has been transferred from the agricultural industry, and thus 
more likely to be injured than the experienced workers in state-owned coal mines, and to 
have less awareness of safety-related issues (Wright, 2004).  
   An integrated model was constructed based on the existing literature at multiple levels of 
analysis, and is shown in Figure 1, which summarizes the relationship between HRM, 
employee relations and occupational safety.  
-------------------- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ------------------- 
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THE SAFETY EVOLUTION IN CHINA’S COAL MINING INDUSTRY: A GENERAL 
OVERVIEW 
According to the supervisory pattern of the government and how it has been balanced against 
market and economic power, the evolution of China’s coal mining firms can be divided into 
three periods. The first period was 1950-1978, during which public ownership and national 
planning was the primary control pattern of the government. It was believed at that time that 
only through those two mechanisms could the government take control of the structure of the 
national economy, and restrain behaviors that could otherwise harm public health, safety and 
well-being (Wang, 2004). The second period was 1979-1999. Following the reform and 
opening-up of China in the late 1970s, the national controlling pattern changed, with public 
ownership and national planning gradually replaced by market forces. However, government 
supervision remained. The third period is 2000-the present. On December 30 1999, China’s 
State Council established SACMS, which came under the direct leadership of China’s State 
Economic and Trade Commission. SACMS was placed in charge of safety supervision and 
investigating coal mining accidents. Its establishment symbolized more strenuous supervision 
by the government. 
   Based on statistics gathered by the author from reliable sources1, e.g., official accident case 
books published by SAWS and SACMS and their official websites 2 , the figure below 
illustrates a historical trend in the representative accidents in China’s coal mining industry 
since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. In period 1 (1950-1978) there were 
63 accidents, with an average death toll of 37.08 in each accident. State-owned coal mines 
(SOMs) made up a proportion of 93.7% of all coal mine accidents. It can be seen that the 
state-planned economy was the main form of government in this period and the coal mines 
were mainly state-owned reflecting this. 
-------------------- INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE -------------------- 
   In period 2 (1979-1999) there were 493 accidents, with an average death toll of 17.50. 
SOMs made up a proportion of 41.8% of all accidents. The underpricing of coal resulted in a 
severe shortage, and to mitigate this through increased output, during this period, non-state-
owned coal mines (non-SOMs) were allowed to sell their coal at market-negotiated prices. In 
1979 and 1980, the safety of coal mining production was improved with the establishment of 
safety regulations and laws after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party. However, there were fluctuations, closely related to changes in 
                                                        
1 The dataset includes all severe and extremely severe coal mining accidents that occurred in China from 1950 to 2010, as 
filed in the formal archives of SAWS and SACMS, and some representative accidents of all types, e.g., gas explosions, water 
leaks (see footnote 5 for the definitions of different levels of accident). We did not add more data after 2010, but it can be 
shown from the national level statistics that the number of accidents and casualties has declined a lot in recent years. For 
example, in 2017, the number of coal mining accidents was 219 (death toll of 375), the number of severe accidents was 6 
(death toll of 69), the number of extremely severe accidents was 0, and the death rate per million tons of coal production was 
0.106 (decreasing rate of 32.1%). (Xinhua net, 2018). 
2 E.g., Collection of Most Severe Accidents, 2000-2003, Collection of Most Severe Accidents, 2004-2005, China Labor and 
Social Welfare Press, March 2005, first edition. Collection of Most Severe Coal Mining Accidents, Coal Industry Press, May 
2000, first edition. Accidents in China’s Coal Mining and Professional Analysis, Books I & II, edited by Wang Jiefan & Li 
Wenjun, published by China Coal Industry Press, 2002. 
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state regulations. For example, in 1983, the State Council published regulations termed 
youshui kuailiu (Water Flows Quickly) to encourage the rapid development of township-and-
village coal mines (TVMs) and thereby satisfy the demand for coal. The blind explosion in 
TVMs caused negative effects as employers exclusively sought profits, decreased safety 
considerations in their equipment, recruited rural labor and temporary workers at the lowest 
cost, and ignored safety laws, even making a reckless move towards illegal production. It can 
be observed that non-SOMs made up a larger proportion of all coal mine accidents and 
attracted more attention in this period.  
   In period 3 (2000-2010) there were 70 accidents (mostly categorized as severe and 
especially severe in our dataset)3, with an average death toll of 51.23. Accidents at SOMs 
made up a proportion of 34.3% of all accidents. Before 1998, the Ministry of the Coal 
Industry within the central government was responsible for overseeing all key state coal 
mines4. Due to the many policy burdens on state-owned enterprises and competition from 
small coal mines, the profits of the key SOMs were negative in the 1990s. To provide a 
greater profit incentive, the management of the key SOMs was shifted to the provincial 
governments, through a delegation decision made at China’s ninth National People’s 
Congress in March 1998. This decentralization only lasted until February 2001, though, when 
SAWS was established, representing a new stage for China’s coal mining industry. In 2003 
SACMS became an institute supervised directly by the State Council, and a top-down line-
management safety supervision system was formed. Since 2006, the occupational safety 
performance of China’s coal mining firms has improved, with a steady decline in casualties, 
the number of accidents, and direct economic losses.  
   Firm ownership shows itself to be a factor in the variance in safety performance through the 
different time spans. Based on the safety performance indexes in both coal mining firm 
ownership types, the accidents between 1950 and 1974 occurred solely in SOMs. This was 
due to the fact that other ownership types did not exist then. There were 50 accidents over 
1950-1974, with a total death toll of 1739, and a total injury toll of 786. From 1975 to 2010, 
the number of accidents (239) and total death toll (5969) in SOMs were lower than those in 
non-SOMs.   
-------------------- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE -------------------- 
   In the 1980s, especially after the State Council published the youshui kuailiu (Water Flows 
Quickly) policy, there was a steady increase in the production output of TVMs. However, the 
death toll also increased rapidly in non-SOMs, which made up 84.20% of all coal mine 
accidents in 1989. In the 1990s, the death toll in the non-SOMs raised still higher, comprising 
78.23% of all coal mine accidents in 1998. From the start of the 21st century, with the 
increase in government supervision, the annual death toll in the SOMs began to decline, but it 
is only since 2006 that the annual death toll in the non-SOMs has begun to decline. 
Meanwhile the proportion of non-SOMs among the coal mines at which accidents occurred 
                                                        
3 The number of especially severe accidents in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 was 1, 1, 1, 0, 0 and 2 respectively.   
4 SOMs are divided into two kinds: key SOMs and local SOMs, and the central government took direct control of the former 
category before 1998. Although the authority to control the key SOMs was allocated to local government after 1998, they 
were still referred to as key SOMs. The other type of coal mine, known as TVMs by law, includes collective-owned, joint 
venture, private, foreign-invested and other coal mines. To avoid confusion, we use the terms SOMs and non-SOMs in our 
paper.  
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was still increasing, and between 2000 and 2010, the ratio of deaths in SOMs to those in non-
SOMs was 7:5.  
-------------------- INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE -------------------- 
   In terms of the death rate per million tons of coal production in the state-owned and non-
state-owned firms, except for the first several years, when there were no non-SOMs, the 
death rate in the non-SOMs has always been much higher than that in the SOMs. This is due 
to factors such as the occurrence of coal seams, financial strength, management practices and 
workers’ lack of abilities. Before the 1980s, the death rate in the SOMs was relatively higher 
in the first national Five-Year Plan period and the years of the Cultural Revolution. After 
1980, the death rate in the SOMs was typically around two, except in the year 1985, when 
two especially severe accidents occurred. Since 2006, the death rate in the SOMs has 
declined dramatically to less than one. The situation in the non-SOMs has been quite 
different. After 1980, the death rate in the non-SOMs experienced a rapid increase, connected 
to the youshui kuailiu policy. After the mid-1990s, another dramatic rise occurred, with the 
death rate exceeding 12 in some years. Affected by Asian financial crisis in 1997, some 
TVMs were closed down, and the death rate accordingly declined slightly. The sound safety 
situation did not last long though. Since 2000, with the rapid development of the Chinese 
economy, the supply of national resources could again not meet the demand, leading to the 
reopening of many TVMs and the return of the high death rate. In 2003, the government 
began to rectify the situation and shut down illegal small coal mines, which lowered the death 
rates in 2003 and 2004 respectively. However, in areas where taxation of TVMs contributed a 
large proportion of the local financial income, it was difficult to close these small coal mines. 
Therefore, in 2005 the government initiated a three-year strategy to solve the safety problems 
in small coal mines nationally. As a consequence, a declining trend in the death rate in non-
SOMs can be observed after 2006. Although this rose again in 2009, it then dropped to a 
relatively low level of 4.32 in 2010.  
-------------------- INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE -------------------- 
   It can be seen that the majority of normal accidents in the representative dataset occurred in 
SOMs, while the majority of the severe accidents occurred in non-SOMs5. Also, in SOMs, 
the death toll was likely to be at either extreme: SOMs made up the majority of the small 
accidents and extremely severe accidents, while non-SOMs made up the majority of medium-
intensity accidents, that is, those that were severe but not extremely severe. However, in 
terms of the death rate per million tons of coal production, SOMs appear to perform much 
better than non-SOMs in general, according to the statistics.  
                                                        
5 An extremely severe accident refers to one in which more than 30 people were killed, or more than 100 people were 
severely injured, or economic losses of over 100 million yuan were caused. A severe accident refers to one in which 10-30 
people were killed, or 50-100 people were severely injured, or economic losses of 50-100 million yuan were caused. A big 
accident refers to one in which 3-10 people were killed, or 10-50 people were severely injured, or economic losses of 10-50 
million yuan were caused. A normal accident refers to one in which less than 3 people were killed, or less than 10 people 
were severely injured, or economic losses of less than 10 million yuan were caused. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
China’s coal mining industry’s safe production management system is multi-stakeholder in 
contrast to those of its counterparts abroad. Firms are the primary actors responsible for 
production safety, and workers are required to comply with the regulations and labor policies. 
The industrial administrative authorities take the role of monitoring, supervising and 
inspecting the safety work within the industry according to central regulations and standards, 
while the state regulatory agencies serve as the leading authority, issuing and enforcing safety 
regulations.  
   With the regulation of the market and government, the traditional unitary employment 
relationship in China has been shifted, with the establishment of various economic forms and 
managerial styles. Along with the industrialization process that occurred in the 1980s and 
1990s, accompanied by gradual privatization and rapid marketization (Taylor, 2002), the ‘re-
invented’ industrial relations (IR) 6  system has significantly influenced recruitment and 
selection, the wages and reward system, and social security problems (Ding & Warner, 1999). 
The employment relationship has been more dynamic in China, manifesting in various 
ownership types, and has also triggered some problems which can be seen in a series of labor 
conflicts, in which OSH is a serious and salient issue. The IR system consists of three players, 
namely management organizations, workers and the formal/informal ways they are organized, 
e.g., trade unions, and government agencies (Dunlop, 1993). Thus, our framework is quite 
straightforward regarding the relationship between the IR system and occupational safety, as 
we review the relations from the viewpoints of different IR players, and evaluate their 
positions on and influence over safety outcomes.  
   First and foremost, how workers are treated by management organizations essentially 
determines their well-being. Although relevant management practices are in place, e.g., the 
safe production responsibility system, a majority of employers in China’s coal mining 
industry have adopted cost-control-oriented HR practices under Zacharotos (2001)’s 
classification, especially those that have had accidents occur. These practices include 
recruiting unqualified cheap labor, reducing technical and administrative investments, 
preferring punishment to motivation, and putting ordinary workers in critical positions, as a 
means to maximize coal production as their number one priority given the huge demand for 
coal. In terms of labor protection, the management invests as little as they can in safety 
equipment, and even fail to provide the absolutely necessary self-rescuer system to every 
underground worker. As such, coal mining workers are treated merely as a commodity in the 
attempt to achieve profit maximization, at a huge cost to their well-being. These control-
oriented management practices are neither able to develop a competent labor force nor to 
sustain a harmonious employment relationship, thus are negatively related to occupational 
safety performance. 
   Second, the transformation of the traditional unitary employment relationship has resulted 
in the creation of many temporary workers and workers without a legal contract, a more 
flexible option for organizations7. The segregation and institutional controls such as the 
                                                        
6 In this paper, IR is defined in its traditional and broad sense (Kaufman, 2001), and used interchangeably with employment 
relationship, employee relations, and labor relations.  
7 In recent years, there has been a trend among China’s labor-intensive factories in low-skilled industries to use labor 
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household registration system (hukou) have forced many rural migrants, who are usually less 
educated (Tan, Zhao, Sang, Li, Luo & Li, 2006), into segregated, low-skilled and low-paying 
jobs in cities, jobs usually involving with most hazardous occupational threats. Unfortunately, 
most miners are migrants from rural areas, for whom mining is the only feasible way to make 
a living. As an growing labor force in China’s industrialization process, rural migrant workers 
have been treated differently from their urban counterparts in many ways, such as 
occupational welfare and wages (Meng & Zhang, 2001), and seeking a balance between 
efficiency, equity and voice in the IR system has been a luxury they could not afford (Budd, 
2004).  
   As workers’ collective organizations, Chinese trade unions have had very little involvement 
in accident prevention in coal mines, not to mention a lack of ability to properly represent 
workers’ voice or organize strikes or collective bargaining on behalf of any substantial 
interests for workers (Liu, 2011), although OSH is set as a precondition for all other workers’ 
rights, according to China’s Trade Union Law. Not only that, but the Chinese trade unions 
have a very vague and ambiguous relationship with the management, as they are financially 
dependent on it and include members of the senior corporate executive among their 
membership and even their leadership, although they do demonstrate better performance in 
private and foreign-invested firms. Thus, it is not difficult to understand why trade unions are 
predicted to be powerless to solve workers’ problems or represent them collectively to submit 
grievances.  
   Last but not least, various regulations have been issued and implemented by the central 
government to ensure coal mining safety in China at different hierarchical levels. These 
regulations have had a positive yet sometimes delayed effect on safety performance (Kong, 
Cai & Guo, 2010). Since 2005, public monitoring and corruption punishment have become 
new key words in central regulations. Governments at all levels have had great difficulty 
enforcing the safety regulations as, in areas with few other sources of income, powerful 
forces are working for the survival of many unsafe small mines, especially TVMs. In the 
interests of the state mines and in an attempt to reduce competition, safety costs were foisted 
on small mines (Wright, 2004). Also, decentralization made collusion between regulators and 
coal mining firms more likely, as coal mine death rates rose in regulators’ places of birth (Jia 
& Nie, 2017). Media exposure has been found to have a deterrent effect on collusion though.  
   In sum, the nature of IR has hardly evolved in line with the direction of industrial 
civilization during China’s transition to a mixed economy since the 1980s. To apply the IR 
system to China’s coal mining industry, it is proposed that the unilateral orientation of HRM 
practices, the discriminated-against workforce and the ambiguous role of the trade unions, 
and the weak enforcement of government regulations, together predict deteriorating safety 
performance in coal mining firms.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
dispatch services, which have consigned workers into an unfree labor regime (Smith & Chan, 2015). 
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CASE STUDIES 
We conducted field studies in two state-owned coal mines (Mine Z and Mine L) located in 
the city of Huaibei in Anhui Province, China. The coal-mining industry serves as one of the 
major pillars of the city’s economy. Mine Z has a ratified production capacity of 2,200,000 
tons per year and 4,443 employees. It was built and put into operation in 1961 with a 
designed capacity of 750,000 tons per year. It has a sound safety performance record, and 
serves as a safety model in the industry. Mine L was established in 1992, which started 
operating in 1998. It has a ratified production capacity of 450,000 tons per year and 1,120 
employees. Its capacity was originally designed to be 300,000 tons per year, and it was 
technically improved and expanded in 2004. Mine L’s safety performance is around the 
medium level for the industry.  
   Field studies, interviews and archival analyses were adopted. The fieldwork started on 18 
February 2011 and lasted for two weeks, during which the author spent time in the workplace 
together with the managers and workers. Follow-up telephone interviews were conducted to 
obtain additional information after the field studies were completed. Before the interviews, 
we informed the interviewees of the pure academic purpose of the study and told them that 
their personal information would remain confidential.  
   We conducted 26 formal semi-structured interviews with the mine manager, the safety 
manager, the labor and wages department manager and personnel, the safety supervision 
department manager and personnel, the labor union chairman, the publicity department 
manager, the discipline inspection commission officer, the safety officer, the mining area 
leaders, team leaders and frontline workers (of various types: excavating, tunneling, 
mechanical, transportation, etc.) in both mines and in the group enterprise to which Mine L 
belongs. The labor and wages departments in coal mines function similarly to HR 
departments in modern enterprises, except that the former get more involved in dealing with 
labor relations issues. We conducted in-depth interviews with the managers and focus groups 
with the workers. We also ensured that the managers were not present during the workers’ 
focus groups. Besides this, we also held several informal conversations with the staff, for 
example during dinners. From the archives, we obtained safety data, policy descriptions, 
training plans, compensation regulations, performance appraisal cards, and so on, from both 
mines. In addition, the author went down into Mine L on 21 February 2010, approached 
frontline workers and inspected the workplace, for example looking at the control station, the 
preparation area and the workers’ underground lounge.  
   The occupational safety performance record of Mine Z was better than that of Mine L, as 
shown by the comparison of safety data between 1997 and 2010 given in Table 2. The loss of 
coal production and the ratio of death toll to total number of employees were much lower in 
Mine Z than in Mine L. Not only that, although safety performance has been enhanced in 
both mines since 2000, the extent of the improvement has been greater in Mine Z than in 
Mine L. Mine Z has achieved a sound record of zero accidents between 2004 and 2009, while 
Mine L has had some accidents within this period. Meanwhile, the number of ‘three-
violations’8 by workers in Mine Z was less than a quarter of the number in Mine L, despite 
                                                        
8 Three-violations refer to any violation behavior in the three aspects: a. violation of rules regarding command 
and order; b. violation of rules regarding operational procedures; c. violation of rules regarding workplace 
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the fact that Mine Z has four times as many employees as Mine L.  
-------------------- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE -------------------- 
The effect of government regulations 
According to the historical safety data for the two coal mines, their safety performance has 
risen significantly since 2000. In particular, death casualties and the number of severe injuries 
dropped rapidly after 2005, and the numbers remained at zero for several years after that. 
This phenomenon can be explained by the coal mining safety policies and regulations that 
have been issued by China’s government since 2005. The following examples illustrate this.  
   China’s State Council issued decree No. 446 of Special Regulations on Prevention of Coal 
Mine Accidents on September 3 2005, which was a very rigorous and strict decree. It directly 
impacted many safety aspects in the two coal mines, as both were required to increase their 
investment in safety training and strengthen their management and supervision. Starting from 
2004, the Chinese government increased its investment in safety, in order to safeguard the 
intrinsic safety of the coal mining industry, namely improving automated manufacturing by 
upgrading intelligent equipment and thereby safeguarding the lives of coal mine workers. It 
widely upgraded intelligent and automatic mechanical equipment to reduce energy 
expenditure and enhance effectiveness. In fact, the Chinese government raised 1.5 billion 
RMB by issuing government bonds in order to re-engineer the production process. For the 
two coal mines, automated manufacturing could not be put into place immediately because 
the people who would use the new equipment needed time to adapt to it. For instance, granted 
20 million RMB of government funding, which it combined with its own funds, Mine L spent 
100 million RMB on the re-engineering of safety equipment, and this alone took two years to 
complete, between 2004 and 2006.  
   The Chinese State Council and local governments have imposed greater sanctions 
following accidents since 2005. In the case of an accident, the coal mine leader will be fined 
30% of their salary plus the safety risk deposit, in addition to an administrative punishment. 
In response to an accident in which one worker died in Coal Mine L, the head of the 
government and the CCP committee secretary in the local district were dismissed, and all 
members of the management team, functional leaders, and the leader in charge of safety at 
the coal mine were given a penalty of 5,000 RMB each. As a consequence, the mine manager 
of Mine L received reduced compensation that year, od 50,000 RMB less than usual.  
   On June 7 2006, SAWS and six other ministry bureaus released a document called 
Instructions on Strengthening Safety Management of State-owned Key Coal Mines, which 
aimed to ensure the steady improvement of safety issues and facilitate sustainable 
development of the coal mining industry through the strengthening of safety management for 
state-owned key coal mines so as to avoid major devastating accidents. This policy had 
important implications for Mine Z, a state-owned key coal mine, and improving safety there. 
Mine L, a state-owned local coal mine, learned of this regulation and took relevant actions as 
well. On July 19 2010, the State Council issued a document titled Notice on Improving Firm 
Safety in Production Work. This regulation gave safety management a higher status ensuring 
that both mines made every effort to work towards the organizational safety targets.  
   Regulations later began to draw greater attention to internal firm management in particular. 
On September 7 2010, SAWS released the document Regulations on Safety Supervision and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
conducts.  
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Inspection of Coal Mine Leaders, which strictly regulated leaders’ behaviors. For example, 
they were required to accompany workers in the underground workplace by their 
performance management system. In response to this, both Mine L and Mine Z strictly 
implemented the regulations to make sure safety in production was properly supervised and 
inspected. Mine Z designed an evaluation system based on mine leaders entering the mine 
pits, and ensured that there were leaders in the mine pits 24 hours a day. The senior leaders of 
the mine were required to complete at least five shifts per month, other leaders (mostly 
technical heads) no fewer than six. For uncompleted quotas, penalties were applied, and even 
the deduction of the safety deposit for senior managers. Similar practices were adopted in 
Mine L, where the senior managers were required to complete at least five shifts per month, 
of at least eight hours per shift. The difference in the regulations on leaders entering the mine 
pit at the two mines stemmed from the fact that Mine Z gave more autonomy to the leader of 
the shift, who was able to decide to reward workers if they had done an excellent job, e.g., 50 
yuan per time. One worker from Mine Z said: 
   ‘I really welcome leaders entering the coal mine pit to supervise. If we do well, we can get 
money; that’s a great job!’ 
   Problems also arose in the implementation of the above system, as only those leaders who 
had expertise in mining would discover problems during their shifts. Those with little 
knowledge of mining would require a period of training before it was safe for them to enter 
the mine pits. Usually, their main job was to chat with workers in the pit to find out about any 
problems.  
   Leaders from the two coal mines both expressed positive feedback regarding the 
government supervision of safety management and inspection. Generally speaking, the 
overall number of accidents had dropped with the vertical management by SAWS. 
Meanwhile, superiors from government bodies such as SAWS, SACMS, and the local coal 
bureau came to the coal mines from time to time to conduct safety inspections. Actions for 
improvements were suggested, followed by inspection, either comprehensive or specialized, 
e.g., on transportation, depending on the requirements for that particular period of time. It 
was indicated by the leaders that an inspection team from the group to which the coal mine 
belonged also came to conduct inspections regularly. Nevertheless, challenges regarding 
inspections were also raised in the interview, such as staffing levels that were too low to meet 
all the inspection needs for the region. Specifically, only around 15 staff were allocated by 
SAWS to the city to conduct inspections, while there were over 70 coal mines (30 state-
owned, and 40 village mines) in the city, making it hard for inspection staff to conduct 
systematic and thorough checks at times.  
   Given the fact that both mines were state-owned and located in the same geographic area, 
also under the supervision of the same local safety bureau and affected by the same macro 
regulation environment, the implementation of these supervision measures and regulations 
varied a lot between the two mines, which could be explained by the different internal HR 
and labor relations practices being used to standardize and evaluate the workers’ behaviors. 
Below is a comparative analysis of the HR and IR practices in the two mines, together with 
workers’ responses. 
Recruitment and selection 
Neither mine was found to examine applicants’ safety qualifications, focusing only on their 
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physical condition.  
“As long as they meet the requirements for age and education, anyone (male) can be 
recruited as a coal worker.”  
The above quote was from the HR manager in Mine L. For some job positions 
experiencing a high shortage of supply, the education background could be relaxed, with 
applicants of junior high school education or lower being accepted. The selection criteria in 
Mine Z included a physical check (to determine whether they can cope with the underground 
environment, and have neither high blood pressure nor heart disease), a physical fitness test, 
an underground examination, and an educational background check. Mine L mainly recruited 
its labor force from the general society, with fixed selection criteria, including age (between 
25 and 40), physical condition and educational background. The minimum educational 
standard in both mines was junior high school level (Grade 9). In the physical examination, 
the applicant might be asked, for example, to carry a pillar weighing 75-100 kg to walk a 
certain distance. Over 90% of the applicants are rural migrants, often characterized by a high 
level of mobility and turnover.  
In terms of the allocation of workers to special positions, we will use the position of 
security guard as an example. There was a shortage of security guards in Mine L, and 
workers in other job occupation may occasionally serve as security guard. In contrast, 
although there were not many security guards in Mine Z either, they were working efficiently 
and effectively to control the number of behavioral violations.  
Although the selection criteria of both mines had been enhanced since the new 
millennium, the qualifications of coal workers were still relatively low compared to other 
industries. Some coal miners in Mine L were elementary school dropouts in the past, having 
only finished Grade 3, or even being illiterate. Meanwhile, around 5% of the workers in Mine 
Z were illiterate or semiliterate due to historical reasons. Due to the shortage of workers, 
stricter safety-related tests, such as personality tests, safety tendency tests, drug tests, and past 
safety and work experience check-ups, which were commonly used in Western countries, was 
not adopted in the selection processes for these mines (Lauver, 2004, 2007). The publicity 
department manager at Mine L commented on this:  
‘Coal mining is an industry with the most dangerous work conditions and employs 
workers of the lowest qualifications. In such circumstances, the occurrence of accidents is 
inevitable.’  
Training and development 
Before 2000, training was regarded as window-dressing and was perfunctory. With the 
establishment of SACMS and its local branches, both mines began to implement rigorous 
training. On 26 September 2005, SAWS and SACMS printed and distributed a notification of 
‘Coal Mine Safety Training Supervision Inspection Measures (Trial)’9, strengthening the 
supervision of safety training and making it a ‘compulsory exercise’. Both mines had since 
emphasized the importance of safety training, so that it made up a high proportion of 
occupational training.  
   However, significant differences appeared in the processes and effects of training in the two 
mines. In Mine Z, the Labor and Wages Department played an active role in the planning, 
regulating and supervising of training processes. The Career Education Office organized 
                                                        
9 Policy issue number: Safety Supervision General Coal Mine No. [2005]135. 
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examinations for workers, with one small examination every month, and a larger one every 
quarter. In Mine L, meanwhile, a career education team was formed, with the mine manager 
as the team leader. The Labor and Wages Department passively implemented the plans this 
team makes. In terms of training content, in Mine Z, workers were not only familiar with the 
textbook (i.e., they should grasp at least on question per day, and study at least one case per 
week), but also exercised the theoretical knowledge through technology competitions, 
underground drills, and the mentoring system. In Mine L, however, some exercises were not 
completed as planned due to poor time management of training, which was often scheduled 
during workers’ leisure time. Because of their low educational level, some workers were 
unable to take complete notes during the classes and thus could not fully understand the 
information they were given. In terms of appraisals of the effects of the training, Mine Z 
adopted a strict system, with a high qualifying standard. Rewards were given to workers who 
attain high scores in the examinations, and for mentors who trained apprentices successfully. 
In Mine L, meanwhile, penalties were widely used when the training is unsuccessful.  
   In addition, the workers’ perceptions of the training varied between the two mines. Workers 
in Mine Z were general satisfied with how the training content relates to their job, the 
rewards for successful training and felt that the arrangements are reasonably timed. Workers 
in Mine L also regarded training as an important way to enhance skills, but felt that some of 
the training practices did not apply to their roles. One mining team leader said:  
   ‘Reading is an ineffective way for some workers to learn due to their low qualifications. 
Some workers do not have extra time to devote to training as they are older and have parents 
and kids to take care of. Some workers obtain their job qualification certificates through 
mechanical memorizing. It is vital to know how to use the knowledge, though.’ 
   We found that the workers regard their skills, knowledge, and abilities as the fundamental 
determinant of unsafe production and occurrences of ‘three-violations’. Not every worker 
could detect hidden hazards, such as roof collapses and sudden flooding in old tunnels. Some 
workers in Mine L expressed that their present skills did not meet the demands of safe 
production. One worker said:  
   “For some safety knowledge, everyone knows it in theory, but may still be unable to use it in 
practice. Sometimes, you feel it is no problem as no omens take place, but the roof may fall 
down suddenly.”  
   In contrast, workers in Mine Z regarded adequate skills as a necessary condition to be met 
before starting work. They were adamant that new workers must accompany their mentors, 
and should not be allowed to work on their own. One worker said:  
   ‘Although I’ve worked [in mining] for over five years, I am still a new worker. That is 
because the geographical environment varies from place to place. It requires a new round of 
learning in order to work in a different environment.’  
   Through training and development, workers have developed their own safety initiative, 
concerning a shift from ‘the mine wants me to be safe’ to ‘I want to be safe’, which requires 
the workers themselves to promote safety. Due to the lower salaries and higher turnover in 
Mine L, it was a little difficult to motivate the workers to take responsibility for safety 
themselves. In order to enhance their workers’ safety consciousness, Mine Z has adopted a 
sophisticated system of safety practices, a system of refining every work procedure used in 
daily production, ensuring that every worker remembers the standardized process of 
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workflow. One mining worker in Mine Z said:  
   ‘Complying with safety rules is my own responsibility and it has become a habit. At work 
we automatically follow the correct workflow that I have memorized by heart. In the past I 
was often injured at work, although they were all little wounds. But now it seldom happens, 
as I am thinking of these safety procedures and regulations all the time.’ 
Workers’ compensation 
To link the workers’ safety performance to their remuneration and rewards, both mines added 
a safety wage as part of the total compensation package. The system of a safety risk deposit 
was also adopted, under which an amount of money was collected from workers, and would 
only be returned to them if he performed his job safely and had no violations in a specified 
time period. Since 2005, Mine L has adopted safety salaries, which accounts for 30% of total 
compensation. The mine manger of L said: 
   ‘In 2011, over 10 million yuan out of 40 million yuan’s total compensation has been used 
for safety compensation. If workers violate work rules or get into an accident, economic 
penalties would be taken accordingly. The safety goal for 2010 was zero serious injury for the 
whole coal mine, zero minor injury for each work unit, zero serious three-violation behavior 
for each work group, and zero normal three-violation behavior for each individual worker. If 
the goals could not be met, relevant groups or individuals would be penalized. In our coal 
mine, a safety accident with one death toll would cause the deduction of 2650 yuan per 
individual from every worker. And this value increases with the intensity of the accident.’ 
   Naturally, differences in these two mines existed in terms of pay and the workers’ 
perceptions of the compensation practices. The average salary in Mine Z was higher than that 
in Mine L. For example, the salary of a frontline coal digger was around 4,000 yuan per 
month in Mine Z, but only around 2,000 yuan in Mine L. Low salaries reduced workers’ 
safety motivation. One worker in Mine L said:  
   ‘If the salary is only 2,000 yuan per month, I do not care about deductions for violations as, 
whatever happens, the mine will still offer us enough money to live, at some minimum 
standard10. However, if the salary is as high as 4,000 yuan per month, then the deduction for 
violations will also be high, e.g., 1,000 yuan per time, which is a big amount. Workers are 
most afraid of money deductions, which produce negative emotions.’  
   Another worker (also a group leader) in Mine L commented: 
   ‘Honestly speaking, what matters most is money to frontline workers. For the group I am 
leading, it used to work quite well. However, the production capacity could not improve after 
its personal restructuring, and the core reason lied in the low salaries that cannot motive 
people. For the big state-owned coal mine, workers enjoy better salary and welfare, so the 
problem will be less there. ’ 
   In contrast, the workers in Mine Z had more neutral attitudes towards their wages. Indeed 
as the group leader in Mine L said, since Mine Z is a so-called big state-owned one, workers 
have fewer problems in their compensation and thus fewer complaints. One frontline worker 
in Mine Z said:  
   ‘Salaries are earned by our own abilities, and are related to the amount of work we 
accomplish.’ 
                                                        
10 The minimum wage standard in this city is RMB 1010 yuan per month, with few raises in recent years. (data 
on July 1 2013) 
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   The safety risk deposit was lower in Mine L than in Mine Z. A coal digger in Mine Z must 
deposit 1,000 yuan per month, while the corresponding amount in Mine L is 350 yuan. In 
cases of severe accidents or serious violations, Mine Z carried out more rigorous punishments. 
Moreover, there was also a team safety deposit in Mine Z, which meant that if one worker 
violated the safety regulations, all of his fellow team members were to be punished, including 
his direct supervisor (cases are different depending on the level of severity, such as 
occupational injury, serious three-violation behavior, etc). However, in Mine L, it was only 
when a major accident occurred, or the number of cases of ‘three-violations’ exceeded a 
certain threshold, that the whole team would be punished, and even then the punishment was 
not as rigorous as in Mine Z. In addition, safety rewards were allocated in Mine Z, to 
encourage workers to conform to safety rules voluntarily through positive motivation. 
Rewards were rarely used as motivational tools in Mine L.  
Labor relations 
As SOMs, Mine Z and Mine L shared some similarities in their labor relations. Although 
China’s union density in the state sector has declined since 1990 (Liu, 2010), the trade unions 
in these two SOMs fulfilled their duties well in providing the workers with protective 
equipment and annual occupational health checks. However, as Mine Z had greater funds and 
capacities, it had invested more into its workers’ social welfare in terms of pensions, medical 
insurance (including cover for occupational injuries and diseases), and unemployment 
insurance. Thus, there were fewer labor disputes in Mine Z, the workers had more enthusiasm 
for their jobs, and they were devoted to safe production. The relationship between the 
workers and managers in Mine Z was, on the whole, constructive. Most of the workers we 
interviewed in Mine Z mentioned they were satisfied with their jobs. Even among those who 
were unsatisfied, their issues were not as serious as those seen in typical labor conflicts. The 
Labor and Wage Department manager in Mine Z said: 
   ‘When they [workers] have questions, for example about wage payments or occupational 
diseases, they will go to the Labor and Wages Department for help. Usually, these questions 
are answered clearly. After this, if labor problems still exist, they will go to the Board of 
Arbitration, which consists of various relevant personnel from the trade unions and the Labor 
and Wages Department, and the firm’s law consultant’, 
   In Mine Z, workers were encouraged to have informal meetings to discuss job-related 
issues. The regular monthly safety meeting included reflective learning from past accidents 
and a system termed ‘three violations’, as well as reviews of accidents in nearby coal mines. 
One miner explained:  
   ‘Everyone operates according to the safety specifications. If you do not behave like this, 
you will be marked out as different and become isolated.’  
   In regard to workers involved in the ‘three-violations’ system, safety officers would be 
assigned to talk to them and explain the violation risks. One young mining worker from Mine 
Z commented:  
   ‘I think the relationship between colleagues is very important. Although there is a 
generation gap between workers of different ages, we spontaneously consult with older 
workers and team leaders about professional questions.’  
   Moreover, workers’ suggestions on safety were listened to by the top managers on the 
Democratic Reception Day and other occasions. 
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   Labor problems in Mine L, meanwhile, appeared to be mainly connected to the workers’ 
wages. Workers in this mine were very sensitive to their wages, and tended to become quite 
negative when they were unsatisfied with their pay. Some workers also expressed objections 
about management practices, such as unreasonable scheduling of their time. There was no 
sophisticated grievance system for dealing with workers’ complaints in Mine L, meaning that 
workers usually had to go directly to the mine manager to voice their complaints. The trade 
unions had not played the role they should have in this regard. The mine manager of Mine L 
said: 
   ‘Nowadays, workers are very straightforward. If they are unsatisfied or have questions 
about their wages, they will go directly to their team leaders, sometimes the mine manager.’  
   Both mines had a whistle-blowing system in place, encouraging public monitoring and 
inspection of violation behaviors, e.g., the three-violation system, gambling and theft in the 
coal mine. The monitoring also covered misconduct by the leaders, e.g., taking charge of 
others’ shifts, concealing accident information, not entering the mine pits for shifts, etc. In 
Mine L, rewards were given to those who reported violations, e.g., 300 yuan for reporting a 
three-violation behavior, 1,000 yuan for reporting a serious three-violation behavior. Centers 
dealing with three-violation, gambling and theft reporting had been established, and a special 
phone was provided in the Discipline, Inspection and Supervision office. Reporting could be 
done by phone, email, letter, face-to-face or any other reliable means.  
   In terms of workers’ participation in decision-making, the two mines exhibited some 
differences. In Mine Z, the workers’ congress provided a voice on behalf of the workers. 
Every worker was encouraged to report hidden dangers to her/his work unit after the 
completion of a shift, and use the level-of-warning system, meaning they could be actively 
involved in issues related to their safety. The Labor and Wage Department manager in Mine Z 
added: 
   ‘All decisions in our coal mine must be supported and voted for by the workers’ congress. 
The delegates in the congress were selected from the wider pool of all workers and they 
discuss the mine’s policies at their meetings. One proposal on a fixed salary for the workers 
did not get through at the workers’ congress, as the workers thought it was too low, and 
requested an increase of 200 yuan.’ 
   It seemed, on the other hand, that the workers in Mine L were not that interested in taking 
part in decision-making, feeling it was not their business. One worker’s remarks were quite 
representative here: 
   ‘We ordinary workers do not have the right to participate in decision-making, and can only 
listen to the orders given. Our group leader is responsible for allocating work tasks, and can 
resolve any small issues. However, when larger issues emerge, our group leader cannot cope 
with them and they require leaders at a higher level to resolve them.’ 
-------------------- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE -------------------- 
   A comparison of the HR and IR practices in the two mines is provided in Table 3. Mine Z 
adopted safety-oriented HR practices, performed much better at personnel recruitment and 
selection, training, compensation, and labor relations, and as a result could better motivate its 
workers to engage in safety behaviors and enjoyed a better safety performance record than 
Mine L. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have outlined a straightforward theoretical framework of an IR system’s 
influence on occupational safety in China’s coal mining industry. Based on the results of the 
safety performance and field studies of two SOMs, we have particularly examined the 
influence of government regulations, HR and IR on safety performance.  
Theoretical implications 
The strategic HRM framework explains the nature and direction of the relationship between 
HR practices and occupational safety (e.g., Lai et al., 2011; Lauver, 2007; Zacharatos et al., 
2005). Although current HR practices in China’s coal mining firms are far from scientific, 
and fail to provide a high-performance work system, and neither do the single HR functions 
complement each other in such a way as to yield employee commitment (Han & Yu, 2006; Li, 
2006), our field studies have revealed some exploratory attempts at improvement, contrasting 
the cost-control-oriented HR practices in Mine L with the safety-focused HR system in Mine 
Z, in terms of recruitment and selection, training and development, worker compensation and 
labor relations. It can be seen that both firms have added more safety elements into their HR 
practices since 2000, e.g., mandatory safety training and safety risk deposits, which has led to 
a steady increase in safety performance in the new millennium. However, safety-oriented HR 
practices have produced a better safety record in Mine Z than Mine L over the years of 
comparison, while some cost-reduction-oriented practices, e.g., a contracted employment 
relationship, have brought the organization more flexibility (Kochan et al., 1994), and 
negatively influenced occupational safety. One possible explanation is the fact that contracted 
temporary workers such as rural migrants are those with the lowest level of education, and 
they have received less training than their permanent counterparts, as revealed in our study.  
   Our study also presents some explanations of the mechanism through which HR practices 
can contribute to safety performance (Ford & Tetrick, 2008; Zacharatos et al., 2005). 
Naturally, if humanity-oriented values were adopted in coal mines, working schedules were 
arranged properly, and safety knowledge was conveyed to the workers through training by 
practice, workers’ competence would be enormously enhanced. More importantly, if workers 
were encouraged to participate in decision-making and discussions on job-related issues, they 
would be more likely to engage in safety behaviors voluntarily, within a favorable safety 
climate. We have also found that workers’ initiative in ensuring safety and the perceived 
safety climate are connected to occupational safety, which supports findings in the western 
context (Ariss, 2003). In addition, our paper supports the configurational perspective in 
strategic HRM research, which says that the internal consistency of the organization’s HR 
policies and practices should achieve the highest degree of horizontal fit (Wright & Snell, 
1998). In our paper, Mine Z performed quite well in every HR function while Mine L did not 
achieve such synergies, which indicates the importance of the complementary effects of HR 
practices in fostering firm performance. 
   In terms of the institutional factors that impact organizational management practices and 
firm outcomes (Poole, 1986), our evaluation of safety performance since the foundation of 
the People’s Republic of China has provided insightful criteria regarding the effect of 
government regulations, with additional detailed examples from the case studies. Government 
institutions have served as the basis of the fluctuating safety trends and developments in 
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China’s coal mining industry. Not only that, but our study contributes to the national business 
system theory that ownership relations affect the cooperation and control inside and between 
business organizations (Harzing & Van Ruysseveldt, 2006; Whitley, 1992). State and other 
forms of ownership co-exist in coal mining firms, although there is no agreement on which 
form of ownership might outperform the others in predicting safety advantages. Since 2008, 
the government has encouraged state-owned enterprises to merge and acquire small ones, 
favored them in regulations, and awarded them contracts and subsidies. It was then decided to 
close down many small and private coal mines, and state-owned coal mines began to merge 
and acquire other types. However, it has been found that the number of accidents has not 
decreased in big state-owned coal mines, but some of the accidents in those mines have 
tended, on the contrary, to be very severe. It has been inferred that ownership restructuring 
should be accompanied by investment in economic power and management schemes. 
Practical recommendations 
We have employed the IR system (Dunlop, 1993) as an antecedent of occupational safety 
involving the role of management organizations, worker and trade unions, and government 
agencies. In terms of recommendations for coal mine leaders, it is suggested they should 
move from the traditional personnel management paradigm to a modern HRM system, and 
build safety-oriented systems to safeguard coal miners’ well-being. Coal mine managers 
should make applicants’ safety qualifications a top selection criterion, aim to attract enough 
talent to fill special job positions pertaining to safety, and allocate safety personnel more 
efficiently. Managers should also increase the proportion of training devoted to safety, 
emphasize practice and underground operations in training, and use motivational tools to 
improve training outcomes. Workers’ compensation should be integrated into the safety 
management plan, with competitive wages paid to the workers. In particular, managers 
should increase the percentage of safety-linked wages included within the total compensation, 
with rewards for safety performance and penalties for accidents and violations. Team 
compensation should be linked to the collective safe behavior of team members. Managers 
should implement strict regulations on labor protection, occupational disease prevention, and 
social welfare management. In addition, more advanced safety equipment and technology 
should be used in the workplace, to create and maintain safe working conditions for workers. 
Not only that, but it was expressed by the coal mine leaders in this study that intrinsic safety 
– namely safety that is ensured without reliance on the behavior of workers – was key to safe 
production, and that this could only be achieved by sophisticated management schemes and 
sufficient investment in automated equipment and technology, that must in turn be ensured by 
central and local funding. 
   Workers’ participation and voice should not only be highlighted in corporate management 
processes, but also safeguarded by institutions such as relevant government regulations (e.g., 
labor rights protection) and the company’s executive board. When workers are able to 
organize and participate in supervision management via the safety council, government 
regulations will yield better outcomes. In any case, when joined together, workers will at 
least be able to refuse to work in very hazardous situations without the fear of losing their 
jobs. Only when workers are treated with dignity and respect, and enjoy a stable, recognized 
and fair occupation, will the mining industry be able to break free of hazards, blood and tears. 
Ironically, in circumstances where the legal standards have not taken effect, workers have to 
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rely on the ethics of media exposure and public supervision. There are reports on coal mining 
accidents and the media have helped to unpack and release the news, eventually helping 
workers to fight for and gain their labor rights (Juan, 2009). This calls for China’s trade 
unions, as workers’ collective groups, to actively participate in the labor conflict resolution 
process11. Amendments should be made to the legislation to empower workers to set up 
genuine enterprise-level unions (Liu, 2011), so that trade unions can serve workers 
independently, while the law preserves their right to stand down and strike. Possible 
suggestions include excluding senior corporate executives from union membership and 
leadership, securing unions’ financial independence from enterprise management, and 
providing safeguards for the election of trade union leaders and their removal from office.  
   It has been recommended that the government should do more work in publishing 
regulations and rules on punishing unsafe behaviors (Zhou & Xu, 2006), especially 
highlighting the importance of public monitoring and the punishment of corruption, and that 
they should make earnest endeavors to implement the regulations and legislation, despite the 
pressure of local protectionism and corruption among local government officials and coal 
miners. The government should take earnest steps to invest in safety equipment and 
technology in both state-owned and township-and-village coal mines as quickly as possible. 
It may be unwise to close private coal mines and retain state-owned ones given the massive 
demand for coal; production should be fostered instead of suppressed. The central 
government could set up a safety rating system for all coal mines, and specify that only those 
with the lowest safety rating would need to close in the event of safety incidents. In case of 
coal mine closure, steps should be taken to reorganize the workers and equipment so as to 
ensure re-opening and recovery of production as soon as possible. Considering the safety 
deposit that has widely been adopted in coal mining firms, the central government could 
think of issuing policies that provide a certain proportion of these safety funds from taxation, 
which would be returned to coal mines with good records and no accidents. The government 
might also encourage coal mines set up special accounts for safe production with local banks 
as a mandatory practice, to safeguard funds for special purposes.  
   Admittedly, the reasons for and antecedents of coal mining safety are wide-ranging and 
there are other factors that have not been the focus of our study, e.g., the demand and supply 
of coal, geological conditions, economic trends and global competition. In order to prove a 
causal relationship between the claimed human factors and occupational safety, we need to 
collect longitudinal data from coal mines at the establishment level, and evaluate the 
correlations between HR and IR practices and safety performance over different time spans. 
Moreover, although we have conducted a descriptive analysis of safety evaluations and 
government regulations over the years, future research should use regression to investigate 
the effect of institutional variables and other categories of firms on firm performance, e.g., 
ownership structure, firm size, labor force characteristics, as well as industrial and regional 
attributes.  
   In conclusion, the current employment relationship in China’s coal mining industry is rather 
unhealthy, unbalanced and unstable. The shortcomings of the governmental role lie in the 
poor implementation of central policies at the local level, as local units always have their own 
                                                        
11 Scholars have also studied labor-related non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China, which play a bridging role 
between labor and state, while functioning in favor of workers and aiding them fundamentally and significantly (Li, 2015).  
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strategies for catering to new policies, while continuing to do the wrong things exactly as 
they did before. The corruption between local government officials and coal mines is a 
problem, especially in areas where the local economy has largely been supported by the 
taxation of coal mines and where there are lower transaction costs. Various barriers to 
inspection also serve as obstacles preventing the regulations from being as effective as they 
were designed to be. Coal mine managers have invested as little as possible in workers’ well-
being due to organizational imprinting and their ambiguous gains from interest-sharing, 
although our field studies have demonstrated some positive progress towards a safety-
oriented HR and labor relations system. Workers are still in a very weak position as they have 
little voice or engagement in the management and supervision process, and even worse, they 
are not entitled to proper labor protection, nor is there a strong workers’ group/trade union to 
safeguard them in times of hazards or accidents. The coal mining safety supervision system is 
currently in an interim state of adopting a multi-stakeholder framework that will involve not 
only the power of government supervision and legislative authorities, but also contributions 
from the public, media and NGOs, and preferably an inspection group independent of any 
shareholder groups. However, the imbalance of power among different social groups of the 
IR system will not be altered in the short run. 
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Note:  
1. Control variables include, employee personality (i), values (i), past experience (i) and job characteristics (i).  
2. The ‘i’ in the brackets means research at the individual level, the ‘o’ stands for research at organizational level, and 
the ‘n’ refers to research at the national level.  
  
Figure 1. Human Resource Management, Employment Relations, and Occupational Safety: 
A Literature Review 
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Figure 2 Annual Numbers of Accidents and Death Toll in China’s Coal Mining Accidents (1950-2010) 
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Figure 3 Annual Death Toll Percentages for State-owned and Non-state-owned Coal Mines (1950-2010) 
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Figure 4 Annual Death Rates per Million Tons of Coal Production for State-owned and Non-state-owned Coal Mines (1975-2010) 
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Table 1. Occupational Safety Performance in State-owned and Non-state-owned Coal Mines 
Ownership 
No. of 
accidents 
Percentage 
in number 
Death 
toll 
Percentage in 
death toll 
Injury 
toll 
Percentage in 
injury toll 
State-owned 289 46.2 7708 53 2857 70.8 
Non-state-owned 337 53.8 6842 47 1177 29.2 
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Table 2. Comparison of Occupational Safety Performance in Mines Z and L (1997-2010) 
Loss of coal 
production (million 
tons) 
Ratio of death toll to 
total number of 
employees 
Number of ‘three-
violations’  Year 
Z L Z L Z L 
1997 0.65 0 0.0002 0 n.a. 89 
1998 1.54 0 0.0004 0 n.a. 125 
1999 1.27 0 0.0004 0 n.a. 235 
2000 0 0 0 0 n.a. 217 
2001 0.5 8.33 0.0002 0.0029 n.a. 231 
2002 0.97 8.7 0.0004 0.0026 n.a. 452 
2003 0.5 0 0.0002 0 n.a. 436 
2004 0 2.44 0 0.0011 n.a. 624 
2005 0 0 0 0 108 528 
2006 0 2.76 0 0.0009 162 510 
2007 0 0 0 0 185 483 
2008 0 0 0 0 155 462 
2009 0 0 0 0 87 436 
2010 0.46 2.42 0.0002 0.0009 92 340 
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Table 3. Comparison of Human Resource and Labor Relations Practices in Mines Z and L 
HR & Labor  
Relations Practices 
Similarities 
/Differences 
Mine Z Mine L 
S 
Selection criteria have been enhanced since 2000, but applicants still lack 
sufficient qualifications, due to skills shortage  Recruitment and 
Selection 
D 
Workers in special positions work 
efficiently 
Lack of workers in special positions  
S 
Emphasis on training enhanced since 2000, and percentage of training devoted to 
safety increased  
The Labor and Wages Department 
plays an active role  
The Labor and Wages Department 
plays a passive role 
Mainly practice-oriented Mainly textbook learning 
Training 
D 
Mainly use rewards to in response to 
training performance 
Mainly use penalties in response to 
training performance 
S 
Safety wages make up 30% of total wages, and benefits-related wages make up 
half of total wages 
Higher wages (medium to high level 
within the industry) 
Lower wages (low level within the 
industry) 
Safety wages were implemented earlier 
(in 2000) 
Safety wages were implemented later 
(in 2005) 
Higher safety risk deposit Lower safety risk deposit 
More severe punishment of accidents 
and serious violations 
Less severe punishment of accidents 
and serious violations 
More severe team punishment Less severe team punishment 
Safety benefits exist (positive 
motivation) 
No safety benefits 
Compen- 
sation D 
Most workers are satisfied with their 
compensation 
Most workers are not satisfied with 
their compensation 
S Providing labor protection equipment and occupational disease safeguarding 
More social welfare for employees Less social welfare for employees 
Less labor conflict More labor conflict 
Labor Relations 
D 
Formal employee grievance system 
exists 
No formal employee grievance system 
 
 
 
